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The Talmud - A Gateway
To The Common Law
Charles Auerbach

JEWISH LAW has its source in the Divine Commandments, precepts and
ordinances given to the children of Israel through Moses at Mt. Sinai and
called the Torah (Torah M'Sinai). In Hebrew, these five books of Moses
are referred to as Torah Shebiktab (the written law). They constitute the
bedrock of all Jewish law. These commandments, precepts and ordinances
as set forth in the written law are enunciatory in nature and required much
interpretation. There evolved, therefore, through the many generations, a
great mass of oral teachings interpreting these laws, so multifarious as to
require orderly arrangement. The work of assemCHARLEs AUERBACH (A.B., 1920, LLB.,
bling this vast accumula1922, Western Reserve University) is a praction of laws and traditions
ricing attorney in Cleveland, a member of the
faculty of Cleveland-Marshall Law School, and
chairman of the Court of Conciliation and

was begun by the great and
noble expounder of the

Arbitration of the Cleveland Jewish Commanity Counl.

law, Hillel, about 200 B.C.
and was carried on after

him by many teachers
(Tannam), among whom the most outstanding were Raban Johanan
Ben Zakkai (circa 70 A.D.) and Rabbi Akiba (circa 130 A.D.) A final
redaction was undertaken by Judah the Prince and was completed by him
some time before his death, which occurred about 220 A.D. His legacy
to the Jewish people was the Mishnah as we know it. The Mishnah is
divided into six orders and deals with agricultural laws, prayers, festivals
and fasts, family life, civil and criminal jurisprudence, sanitary and food
laws of "clean" and "unclean:"
The Mishnah, however, does not include all the sayings of the Tannaim,
for in the process of redaction, much Tannaitic material was excluded. These
omitted portions are contained in volumes called Baraithoth. 1 Upon the
death of Judah the Prince, a number of his disciples, called Amoraim, chief
among whom were Rab Johanan in Palestine and Rab and Shmuel in
Babylon, began the work of interpreting the Mishnah, resulting in two
IThe Baraitha (the word means "extraneous") is a collection of the Tannaitic material which was not included in the compilation of the Mishnah. This excluded
material was compiled and arranged in an orderly fashion by the disciples of Judah

the Prince and is found an the Baraithoth.
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works of exegesis each called the Gemara. This interpretation was carried
on long after them by their disciples and those who followed them, the
last of whom were Rab Ashi and Rabina in Babylon. Rabina died in the
year 499 (circa) leaving behind those who, although not his associates, were,
nevertheless, close to him and knew his thinking. These men continued
the work of interpretation from about 500 A.D. to approximately 540 A.D.
They are known as the Saborayim. With the last of the Saborayim the
Talmud is completed. The Gemara begun by Rab and Shmuel is called
Talmud Babli (the Babylonian Talmud) and the one begun by Rab
Yohanan is called Talmud Yerushalmi (the Palestinian Talmud). This
extra-Pentateuchal law contained in the Mishnah, in the Baraithoth and in
the Gemara constitutes the Oral Law (Torah Shebea'l-peh) and is collectively called the Talmud.
The Talmud, therefore, is a gigantic creation consisting of 63 tractates
divided into 523 chapters, and represents the labor of many generations
extending over a period of approximately 800 years. In it may be found
treasures of the Jewish people, who, over the long centuries, enshrined the
most profound and selective thoughts of their most emiment thinkers, who
concerned themselves with the preservation of the tradition of Judaism.
The Talmud may indeed be said to be a primordial tree of life with massive
trunk and numerous branches, its roots deeply and firmly imbedded in the
eternal life-giving soil of the Torah Shebiktab (the written law), for it
contains the Halakhic laws from the days of Moses through the Amoraim
to the last of the Saborayim. It contains Jewish legal and moral concepts, religious philosophy, medicine, astronomy and all branches of science known
to the world during those 800 years. There is reflected in it the history of
the Jewish people from their beginning to approximately the middle of the
sixth century, as well as the impact of the non-Jewish world upon the life of
the Jewish people during those 800 years, and the means employed by them
against the dangers of physical annihilation and loss of their spiritual identity.
There is in the Talmud Haggadic material which embodies the sacred
legends, allegories, fables and pithy sayings of the Jewish people and many
philosophic discussions. This portion of the Talmud is essentially moral in
character, establishing standards and differentiating between righteous and
unrighteous conduct. A few examples of such material may be in order:
He who is loved by man is loved by God.!
The world exists through the breath of school children.!
Commit a sin twice and it is as if it were a sin no longer.4
2

Pirke Aboth, Chapter 3.

aShabbath 119b

'Yoma 8b
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An illustration of the random material in the Gemara, which has no
relevance to the subject under treatment, is a bit of sound advice found in the
discussion of the law of bailments. Here Rabbi Isaac said, "One should
always divide his wealth into three parts, investing a third in land, a third
in merchandise and keeping a third ready to hand!' 5 Although the moral
teachings of the legends and parables have come down to us carrying with
them lessons of profound ethical significance, they do not possess the binding force of Halakhic pronouncement. Louis Ginzberg, Talmudic scholar
who concerned himself primarily with the study of Haggadic literature, in
speaking of the life of the Jewish people after the destruction of the Second
Temple (70 A.D.) says of this material:
The scripture, or to use the Jewish term Torah, was the only remnant
of their former national independence and the Torah was the magic means
of making a sordid actuality recede before a glorious memory. To Scripture was assigned the task of supplying nourishment to the mind as well

as the soul, to the intellect as well as the imagination and the result is the
Halakha and the Hagaddah.'

The Halakha deals with the laws of the Jewish people from which Jewish
jurisprudence was derived. It embraces laws of purity, chastity, property,
contracts, negligence, damages, domestic relations, crimes, evidence-m
short, the gamut of basic jurisprudence.
The Talmud has had a long and turbulent history and much has been
written about it. In medieval times it was thrown to the flames, but it was
also stoutly defended by Jews and non-Jews. In times of dire crisis, when
the Talmud was threatened with extinction, the vision of non-Jewish Talmudic scholars, such as Reuchlin and Mirandula, saved it from destruction.
Its history is that of the Jews themselves. It has traveled with them and has
grown with them; it contains the most encompassing expression of all that
is Jewish. The aging and yellowed pages of Talmudic law and lore are a
part of the living history of a people which has wandered the surface of
the earth and has absorbed in its dispersion the multifarious culturepatterns of man, always retaining intact the cherished treasures of its spiritual heritage.
In appraising the legacy of the ancients to Western culture, surprisingly
few mention the impact of Jewish jurisprudence upon our system of laws,
most writers attributing our legal legacy to Rome almost entirely. Yet,
long before the promulgation of the Justiman Institutes, the Jewish people
had developed a very effective system of jurisprudence. More significant
perhaps is the foundation upon which this network of law rests. The basic
motif of Jewish jurisprudence is the moral law and the leitmotif of the
'Baba Mezia 43a
01 GINZBERG, THE LEGENDS OF THE JEws, Preface (6th ed. 1913).
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moral law is "Zedek," which connotes both righteousness and justice.
(Zedek U'mishpot)
The Jewish word Torah implies a concept more spiritual and less trenchant than the austere Latin word "Lex," for it connotes more than laws regarding rights and wrongs between man and man. It includes duties and
obligations not only of man to man, but of man to God.
The Torah is the ultimate source of all law in Judaism and whatever
is legally wrong is morally wrong - is contrary to the letter or spirit of
the law; if it were not, the law would not have stamped it as wrong.!

I contend that much of this moral and spirittal aspect of Jewish law has
found expression in our common law through the influence of the Church
as well as through Mosaic and Talmudic law proper.
It would be presumptuous to give the impression that in an effort as
brief as this, a thesis can be developed by which may be established a clearly
defined reliance of our common law upon Talmudic jurisprudence. Studies
in that direction are now being carried on by Jacob J. Rabinowitz, an eminent scholar and professor of law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem,
whose book in which he treats this subject is about to appear. All I can do
here is to present a few aspects of the Anglo-American and Hebraic systems
of jurisprudence which are strikingly parallel and suggest that the
younger may perhaps have had the benefit of the thoughts and concepts
found in the older, without intending thereby to minimize or detract from
the majesty of the common law.
I shall concern myself in this short paper with a discussion of some of
the concepts found in a few of the tractates in the order Nezikin, taking
note of such principles as parallel our common law. A thorough study of
this order alone would require years of effort and its complete mastery,
perhaps a lifetime. My purpose, therefore, is limited. But if I succeed in
stimulating the interest of students of law sufficiently to impel them to
seek for themselves the treasures to be found in these books, I shall be well
rewarded. For it is my contention that many of our common law principles
and many of the legal forms and customs which we find difficult to explain,
trace their origin more or less directly to sources in the Written and Oral
Law of the Jewish people. This and the striking coincidence in legal think8
ing in evidence in both legal systems have prompted this effort.
LAw OF CoNTRAcTs
The law of contracts offers some striking parallels as well as divergencies
between the Jewish and Anglo-American systems of jurisprudence. Street,
in his Fountdatns of Legal Lability, divides obligations into two cate7 1 HERzoG, THE MAIN INsTrrTIoNs OF JEwIsH LAw 53 (1936).

1I acknowledge with profound thanks the kindly interest and gracious help of my
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gories: those which are made obligatory upon the person regardless of his
own will or undertaking and those wich obligate him as a result of his
prior agreement, promise or undertaking. The former are the obligations
and duties breaches of which are denominated "torts", the latter are the
obligations falling under the broad general term "contracts."9
I shall undertake to show, within the limits of this paper, that the fundamental concepts of each of these categories of obligation were defined in
Jewish law with remarkable clarity and that there is a marked similarity
between them and our modern understanding of these principles.
Our present day definition of a contract is as follows:
A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way
recognizes as a duty."0

When we speak of contracts in modern terminology, there comes to mind
immediately either a single binding promise made by one person to another
or what is more general, mutually binding promises by two persons to one
another. This was not always so; it took many years for this concept to
develop.
In Glanville's time, the conception of contract was that of debt, and the
obligation arising therefrom was founded not upon the promise made by
the parties to the transaction but upon a legal duty incumbent upon them to
perform (known in Jewish law as Milveh) The history of English law of
contracts is in a measure the history of a transition from the conception
of a contractual duty imposed by law to that of obligations resulting from
11
promise.
According to early English law, a contract to be effective required
something more than the parties' mutual consent. The payment or part
payment of the purchase price by one, or the delivery of the chattel by the
other, in a sale of goods, for example, was required to create the obligation.' 2 The concept of barter is here dearly apparent. This according to
Street' 3 was a narrowing of the Roman concept of consensual agreements.
This approximates almost identically the Judaic concept of Hiyub, which was
inherent in Kinyan, as we shall see a little later on in this paper.
Part payment was enough to create a valid obligation, but "earnest"
caused difficulty, for the payment of earnest was not sufficient to bind the
friends and revered Talmudic scholars, Rabbi Israel Porath, of Cleveland, Ohio, and
Rabbi Mordecai Gifter, professor of Talmud at Yeshivah Telshe, Cleveland, Ohio,
and the very useful suggestions of my son David.
'GRISMORE, CONTRACTS 1,n.1 (1947).
'0 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §1 (1932)
112 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABIIrTY 5 (1906)
1

Ibd.

13Ibid.
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parties to a legally valid agreement. What of the buyer who gave only
earnest to bind the bargain and withdrew? As to him, the problem was
not too difficult of solution for if he withdrew from the bargain, he forfeited his earnest. As to the seller, however, the problem was more complex. In Bracton's time, this was settled by imposing upon the withdrawing seller a penalty of double the amount he received from the buyer by way
of earnest.14 This did not satisfy the merchants who required agreements
in which the obligations undertaken were mutually binding. They therefore established among themselves the earnest as a matter of form recognized by the law of merchants, by means of which a binding and obligatory
consensual agreement was created. Nevertheless, during the reign of King
Edward I (1303), a statute was passed (Carta Mercatoria) declaring, "every
contract between the said merchants and any persons whencesoever they may
come, touching any kind of merchandise shall be firm and stable so that
neither of the said merchants shall be liable to retract or resile from the said
contract when once God's Penny shall have been given and received from the
parties to the contract."' 5 Was this form or did this connote consideration?
It is difficult at times to differentate between form and consideration for
the two often merge and what seems to be form may be consideration.
Whether it be denominated form or consideration, the effect was the same;
God's Penny was an essential requirement to create a valid obligation.' 6
We shall have occasion to call attention to the resemblance of both these
doctrines to Jewish law when we discuss "Asmakhta" and "Kinyan."
The Anglo-American theory of contractual sales obligation required
much time to free itself from the principle of barter. The Jewish concept of
obligation underlying the law of contracts underwent the same difficult
metamorphosis. Both systems required compliance with fixed formalities
to create a binding sales agreement, and both systems needed much refinement of thought to overcome the constricting influences of form and
attach legal liability to contracts per se. The Jewish counterpart of the
fixed form in Anglo-American law is Kinyan. Its beginmngs stem from7
the earliest days of Jewish history and may be found in the Book of Ruth.'
It will be recalled that when Boaz bought from Naomi the land which her
deceased sons had inherited from their father, he did so by drawing off his
shoe and calling upon witnesses to attest the transfer. Of this method the
Book of Ruth says:
Now this was the custom in former time in Israel concerning redeeming and concerning exchanging, to confirm all things: A man drew off his
shoe and gave it to his neighbor; and this was the attestation in Israel.
142 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 208 (2d ed. 1895).
2 STEET, FoUNDATIoNs OF LEGAL LIBnrrY 6 (1906).
182 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 209 (2d ed. 1895).
17

Chapter 4:7.
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This device plays an essential role in Jewish law in the transfer and conveyance of property, but it is equally important in the creation of obligations
to buy and sell.
Kinyan, or Kinyan Suddar, is defined as a legal form of acquisition of
objects or of confirming agreements executed by the handing of a scarf, a
shawl, a glove or like article on the part of one of the contracting parties to
the other, as a symbol that the object itself has been transferred or the
obligation assumed.' 8 Note should be taken, however, that the Gemara excludes the use of coins as Kinyan Suddar. By the method of passing a
glove or scarf, a transfer of title was effected. Since the process affected the
res, it is referred to as "fictional barter" as distinguished from Halifin, which
is actual barter. The fulfillment of the requisite of form has played as
important a role in the Jewish law of contracts as consideration, if not more
so, and is necessary in every agreement in which tangible goods are the
subject of the contract So ingrained is this doctrine in Jewish law, that if
the thing purchased is not taken into the purchaser's possession at least fictionally, the agreement between the buyer and seller is called "debarim,"
that is, a contract of "words only" and therefore not binding on either 9 one might say "just talk."
But we find in Kinyan the element of Hiyub, a duty to perform an undertaking. 20 Thus, in the case of A and B bartering two articles, X and Y,
if A hands over his article X to B, we say article X acquires article Y
(Koneh). But where the transaction between the parties is a sale, X
being a useful article and Y money, it is wrong to speak of X acquiring Y.
The proper expression here is not Koneh but Mehaeb (obligates). The
delivery by A to B of the article of use creates an obligation in B to deliver
the money to A. This is the identical concept of contracts which prevailed
in England in Glanvilles time.2 '
It is apparent; therefore, that by the method of Kinyan something more
is accomplished than the mere creation of a consensual, mutual agreement.
Actually the fulfillment or performance of one part of the agreement is
thereby effected; the payment of the purchase price may remain executory
but not the transfer of the thing purchased.2 2 Since a valid sales contract demands an immediate transfer of the res either actual or symbolic, it follows,
therefore, that the thing sold or contracted for is required to be a tangible
object then in being 23 and in the seller's possession.2" It is precisely at this
SBaba Mezia 47a
Baba Mezia 49a, 74b

'Baba Meia 45 b
u2 STREET, FoUNDATIONs OF LEGAL LIABIImTY 5 (1906).

=Baba Mezm 45b.,
' Baba Mezza 66b Kiddusbn 63b
':Baba Kamma 69b.
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point that the concept of contract as barter fell short of the needs of the
times. Requirements of commerce and trade demanded a more elastic
method of entering into sales agreements. Some way had to be found to
make possible the creation of a valid obligation m praesenti for the sale of
goods not in esse and of goods not then in the possession of the vendor.
What was needed, of course, was the modern concept of contract which
would be free from the constrictions of the principle of barter (Halifin).
To fill this need, the form of Kinyan Etten- an obligation to give or
convey in the future- was developed. Much controversy, however, arose
as to the validity and the effectiveness of this method of undertaking obligations to sell goods. There was considerable doubt whether an agreement
so made was binding on the estate of the person making it.
The method of creating obligations by a solemn oath (Shebuah) did
not suffice. Since the oath was taken by the person making it, it was bind25
ing only upon him and not upon his heirs or upon his estate.
A very scholarly and illuminating dissertation on how the Jewish law of
sales freed itself from the barter concept, at least according to some auis given by Rabbi Dr. Isaac
thorities, although the point is far from settled,
26
Herzog of Jerusalem, Chief Rabbi of Israel.
He points out that some students sought to solve this problem by equating Hiyub with Uditha. Uditha was a recognized device in the Talmud
created when A, a dying man, desiring to transfer his money to B, who could
not take from him by devolution or by will, declared that he owed B the
amount which he sought to leave him, thereby effecting an immediate transfer of the money to B.27 It was an admission of a fictional debt. Indeed, it
may be said that it was fictional admission of a fictional debt, but it affected
a transfer of the res. If this doctrine were applicable, it was argued, Hiyub
would have to be an admission of a debt already in existence and would
therefore hinder rather than promote the purpose of creating a present obligation to effect a future transfer of goods, for the very object sought to be
attained was the creation of an obligation. It is dear, therefore, that
equating Hiyub with Uditha could not bring about the creation of a binding
executory obligation to sell goods.
Malmonides equated Hiyub with Areb (surety) But by this concept
no property could pass because the Areb assumed a mere monetary obligation. There being no undertaking thereby to sell, convey or transfer any
determinate or tangible property, this device could not be made applicable
to sales agreements. Furthermore, Kinyan is not generally necessary to
n 2 HERZOG, MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEwIsH LAw 99 (1936).
- 2 HERZOG, MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEwisH LAw 93-106 (1936).
" Baba Bathra 149a
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create a binding obligation of suretyship, whereas it is the sine qua non of
an agreement to sell or transfer tangible goods.
We have seen that a contract to sell property not in the seller's possession, or a sale thereof, could not be effected according to Jewish law. The
law, however, permits a creditor to obtain a lien (Shibbud) upon property
of the debtor which is not then in his possession by the process of substtuting the person of the debtor for the property. The Shibbud, though
upon the res, results from the Shibbud upon the person. This was known as
DeikM.28

The insufficiencies of the doctrines of Areb, Uditha, Kinyan, Kinyan
Etten and Shebuah for the purpose intended resulted in the creation of the
concept of Hiyub, or more correctly Hithhayabuth. This was accomplished
by combining parts of the applicable and functional principles of the
doctrines of Areb, Uditha, Kinyan and Deikni.
Thus through the concept of Uditha the promisor acknowledges a
present obligation. Through Kinyan the obligation is made applicable to
tangible property. Through Areb an obligaton which may be carried out
in the future is created, and through Deikni, it becomes possible to obligate
the debtor to a sale of property which is not then in his possession or in esse.
According to Rabbi Herzog, who cites Nethiboth and Kzoth as authorites,20 Hiyub thus created is a means of obligating the seller to carry out
an executory promise to sell tangible goods. It creates figuratively a lien
on hs person to perform that promise, although the buyer cannot follow
the res. He illustrates his position by giving an example, in which if A
binds himself by Hiyub to give a certain object to B, the property does not
thereby pass to B. B has a right only to claim the object, which he can
enforce through a court against A. So that if A, who thus bound himself
to deliver the object to B sells it to C, B cannot recover it from C but he
30
can sue A for its value.
Rabbi Herzog states categorically, however, that in order to create an
agreement through Hiyub or Hithhayabuth, "assuming an obligation binding the person," four elements are necessary1. Express Hiyub, "I hereby obligate myself."
2. Kinyan.
3. Writing.
4. The presence of witnesses.
Having fulfilled these requirements, it is the opimon of Rabbi Herzog
that Hiyub, through its development into Hithhayabuth, became an in31
strument for the making of bilateral commercial contracts.
'Baba Bathra 157a
"2HERZOG, MAIN INSTITUTiONS OF JEWisH LAw

oIbMd.

99 (1936).
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CONSIDERATION

The subject of consideration offers parallels and divergencies between
the two systems of jurisprudence.
Anglo-American jurisprudence treats consideration as follows:
As a general rule an informal promise is not per se enforceable in our
law even though it has been assented to by the promisee. Something more
than mutual assent is in general essential to the creation of an informal
contract. That something more we know as a "consideration." Consideration has been defined as "anything that is of 'detrunent' to the promisee
or of 'benefit' to the promisor."'

Except for the contrary opinion by Mamaomdes, the Jewish law of
contracts generally makes consideration a requisite for creating a binding
contractual obligation. It depends in great measure upon the subject matter of the contract. Thus, for example, in contracts of marriage, suretyship, employment and partnership consideration is necessary. In contracts of
sale, however, Jewish law looks more to the presence of Kinyan than to
consideration. Form is held to be more important than consideration, but
the form imports a consideration. In contracts in which consideration is
necessary, a perutah, a coin of little value akin to the English farthing, is
sufficient consideration. Thus in marriage contracts the Mishnah provides:
If a man said to a woman, 'Be thou betrothed to me with this date or
be thou betrothed to me with this' and one of them (either object) was
worth a perutah, her betrothal is valid!'

This recalls vividly the statute of King Edward I, which required the
transfer of God's Penny to create a valid executory agreement.
But the Jewish theory of consideration offers divergencies, also, from
the Anglo-American theory -particularly in the law of sales. The common law does not generally concern itself with the sufficiency of the sales
price except in cases which shock the conscience of the Chancellor. The
Talmud looks carefully into the sales price. Thus we find in the
Mishnah:
Fraud is constituted by an overcharge of four pieces of silver (ma'ahs)
out of twenty-four, which is a sela. Hence a sixth of the purchase.'

The Gemara interpreting this rule says:
The law is: In the case of less than a sith, the sale is valid; more than
a sixth, it is null; (exactly) a sixth, it is valid.!

The standard of comparison is market value. The law of overreaching is applicable to buyers and sellers alike,s" but it is not as broad in the
-2 HERZOG, MAN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW 101 (1936).
"GRisMoRE, CONTRACTS §§ 53, 55 (1947).
"Kiddushin 26a (In the main, reliance is made upon the Soncino translation of
the Babylonian Talmud, throughout this article. Sonino Press, London, England.)
Tm
Baba Mezia 43.

Baba Meia 50b.
wBaba Mezia 51a,

0
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sale of real estate (Karka) as it is in the sale of personal property (Metaltelin). For whereas in the sale of personalty, the law of overreaching dedares a sale void if the amount of the overcharge is greater than one sixth
of the purchase price, in the sale of realty the measure of overcharge in
order to obtain the same result is one half.3
Is A DETRIMENT TO THE PROMISEE CONSIDERATION?

The doctrine of a detriment to the promisee as consideration, although
not fully developed, was not unknown to Jewish courts and students of
law, and is best exemplified in the law of suretyship.
In seeking to find a consideration sufficient to support the surety's
promise, the following example is crited: "If A says to B, 'Toss a manah
into the sea and I will refund it to you," the contract according to some
authorities is binding.38 Here A, the promisee, receives no financial benefit from B's act of throwing a manah into the sea, whereas B suffers a
loss. It would seem that the loss suffered by B should be the consideration supporting A's promise to repay him. The Talmud, however, focuses
its attention not so much upon the detriment to the promisee, as upon the
gain of the promisor. The consideration is spelled out as a benefit to A,
in the nature of the mental satisfaction he derived when B threw the
manah into the sea. This is sufficient value to create the obligation. The
surety's mental satisfaction is derived from the fact that reliance was placed
upon hun by the lender.3"
PAST CONSIDERATION
At common law it is fundamental that past consideration cannot support a simple contract. Jewish law is quite similar, as will be seen from
the following example.40 According to Jewish law, a marriage contract
must be founded upon consideration and some form of money or its
equivalent must be given by the groom to the bride to fulfill that requirement. In the following case,41 the validity of the marriage contract was
in question. The facts were that the groom, prior to his marriage, had
loaned the bride a sum of money which remained unpaid. He offered
her marriage in lieu of the payment of the loan. The court held the contract invalid as not supported by a present consideration. In answer to
the contention that she thus received value, the court held that this was a
consideration which had already passed, for at the time of her promise to
"Baba Mezia 57a Tosphoth Amar.
" Ritba Baba Mezia 71b.
' Baba Bathra 173b.
"Kiddushn 47a.
a mIhd.
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marry him, she had already obtained ownership of the money he had
loaned her, and Jewish law requires a completely new consideration. It
will be noted, of course, that the court in this case went beyond our common law concept of past consideration. Not all Jewish courts, however,
reached unanimity as to the exact meaning and interpretation of the term.
According to the Rambam (Maimonides), the pre-existing debt is sufficient to support a sale of tangible goods, although not sufficient in Kiddushin (betrothals) 42 Our courts at common law likewise draw a distrnction between a past consideration and a pre-existing debt.
QUASI CONTRACTS
We find in Jewish law a very well-defined principle which requires
payment by the recipient for services rendered or acts performed for his
benefit by another, without his request. The obligation stems not from
an implied promise to pay, but from the fundamental principle that no
one should be enriched at the expense of another without compensation,
3

for to do so is inherently unjust."

In recent years this concept of quasi contracts has gained much ground
over the principle of implied contracts, which predominated, in AngloAmerican law.

For many years the standard concept was the following:

"If A allows X to work for him under such circumstances that no reasonable man would suppose that X meant to do the work for nothing, A will
be liable to pay for it. The doing of the work is the offer, the permission
to do it, or the acquiescence in its being done is the acceptance.""44 In
the absence of such an implied agreement no recovery could be had.

Quasi contracts in general developed from the principle of restitution.
The action was one of debt for the recovery of money paid by mistake or
through extortion, or because of imposition or undue advantage.45 "By
the device of fictional promise the door was opened to the enforcement
of those obligations, previously unrecognized by the common law which
are now known as quasi contracts.""4

Much litigation was required to

alter this view. Even in the days of Lord Mansfield 47 the thought was growing that "the gist of this kind of action is that the defendant upon the
circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and
equity to refund the money." Professor Woodward points out, however,
how difficult has been the transformation of the concept of quasi contracts from that of unplied contracts to one of unjust enrichment:
'2 Yad. Mekhira VII 4.
Baba Meza 101a, Hoshen Mishpat 375.
"ANSON, CONmRACrS § 27 (Patterson ed. 1939)
" WOODWARD, QUASI CoNTRAcTs 4 (1913)
"lid.
"Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1008 (1760)
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Only within the last generation have quasi contractual obligations been
commonly so called. They were formerly regarded as a species of con-

tract and to distinguish them from express contracts and contracts implied
in fact; z.e., contracts in which a promise is inferred from conduct were
called contracts implied in law
But quasi contractual obligations are imposed without reference to
the obligor's assent. He is bound not because he has promised to make
restitution, it may be he has explicitly refused to promise, but because he
has received a benefit, the retention of which would be inequitable."

At common law, we make a distinction between one who has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another and is, therefore, required to
make restitution, and one upon whom a benefit is officiously conferred
by another and who is not required to make restitution. In the first instance, we say that the recipient of the benefit was unjustly enriched,
whereas, in the second, we say he has been enriched but not unjustly.49
In other words, if A mows my lawn in my absence thinking he is mowing
my neighbor's, who requested him to do so, he may probably recover from
me the value of mowing my lawn on the theory that I was unjustly enriched by Is mistake of fact. However, if A mows lawns on my street,
and, without my knowledge or permission, enters upon my lawn and
mows it, assuming that I will accept his labor, he probably would not be
permitted to recover. In the second case, I would be enriched but not
unjustly. A would be considered as having officiously conferred a benefit upon me. The Restatement illustrates this by giving the following
example:5 0
During A's absence, and in the belief that A will be willing to pay for
the work, B improves A's land which is worth and is offered for sale at
$5,000 to such an extent that upon A's return he sells the land for $8,000.
B is not entitled to restitution from A.

Jewish law treats this subject as follows: 5
If one renders a service to another man and confers a benefit upon
him, the latter cannot say to him "Thou hast done it as a favor."

Accordingly, if X plants A's field without A's knowledge, he may recover from A the cost of planting or the value of the improvement made
to the land, whichever is less, upon the theory that it would be unjust to
permit A to become enriched at the expense of X without payment. 52
The rationale is that A should not be permitted to enjoy the benefits of
another man's labor or property without compensation because the creation of one's work is his property and belongs to him.
SWOODWARD, QuAsi CONTRACTS 6 (1913).
'3 RESTATMEW, RESTrruTiON 1,2 (1936).

'4RFSTATaEE,

RESTITON

§ 462 (1936).

" Hoshen Mishpat 2644
'Baba Mezia 101a; Hoshen Mishpat 375.
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The Talmud, however, says further that if the recipient of a boon, such
as fencing in property, protests his unwillingness to accept the benefit but
it is found thereafter that he is guarding it or that he has performed some
other act indicative of his acceptance, he is required to pay the reasonable
value of it, based upon a judicial appraisement thereof, for by so doing,
he has "disclosed his mind," that is to say, his protestations were not
genuine.13 To cite another example, if a workman, without the request
or knowledge of the owner of a field, performs work thereon, at the instance of X, not the owner, who pays him, which work benefits the field,
the owner must pay X an amount equal to the value of the benefit he
received.

54

We see here, therefore, that Jewish law does not make the distinction
between enrichment and unjust enrichment which is made in our present
law of quasi contracts. The Talmud looks rather to the inherent inequity
of allowing one to benefit from the labor or property of another without
restitution. The formula adopted by this example, namely, that of paying
the intervenor the cost of planting or the value of the improvements,
whichever is less, expresses the intent of Jewish law. Enrichment neither
to the intervenor nor to the recipient is intended. The aim is to avoid an
advantage to either at the expense of the other.
Professor Grismore, in discussing quasi contracts, expresses dissatisfaction with the theory of implied contracts as the basis for such obligation,
as well as with the use of the term quasi contracts, saying:
It would be better still if some wholly different name were adopted for
it, so that it would be dear that this type of obligation which is in fact controlled by wholly different principles has no relationship whatever to con-

tract . '

There is a doctrine in our law of quasi contracts known as "dutiful
intervention," which deals with the preservation of life and property in
imminent danger of harm. The rule seems to be that sans contract, the
recipient is under no obligation to pay for the nonprofessional services
which one may render hun in preserving his life during an emergency.
The law creates an irrebuttable presumption that such acts on the part of
the intervenor are prompted by natural human instincts to preserve life
and are conferred without expectation of compensation. It is presumed
that the one performing such acts had no intention to charge for such services. The preservation of another's property may be regarded as dutiful
if the circumstances are such that no tunely or effective notce can be
given the owner that his property is in imminent danger of destruction.
Baba Bathra 4b
Hoshen Mishpat 336
GRisMoR,

CONTRAcTS

§ 8 (1947).
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The benefit received by the recipient in either case, as the result of the
intervenor's efforts, is not considered unjusrY5
Talmudic law presents a most striking similarity with the doctrine.
There is in Jewish law a principle known as Mabriah An (chasing away
the lion) This is a figurative way of stating that if A, without B's
knowledge, does an act by which he prevents damage to B's property,
which is in imminent danger of destruction, such act is considered a
Mitzvah, a good deed, for which it is presumed there is no obligation to
compensate him. The intervenor is "chasing away the lion," as it were.
Should the performer suffer loss in carrying out this good deed, this presumption is rebutted, and the neighbor must make good such loss. But
some Rabbis, at a later date, reinterpreted this principle and held that even
under such circumstances no obligation is imposed upon the owner to pay.
The act was and must remain a Mitzvah, a deed of kindness and good will.
For such deeds no earthly compensation should be expected, and no obli57
gation to pay is thereby created.
ASMAKHTA
There is in the Jewish law of contracts a highly important and farreaching principle of law called "asmakhta." Asmakhta is a rule which
declares to be invalid an assurance made by one that he will pay or forfeit
something in the event of his non-fulfillment of a certain condition, which,
however, he is confident that he will carry out.5
In Anglo-American jurisprudence there has been much dispute as to
whether a promise to pay a specified sum in the event of the non-fulfillment
of an agreement is a penalty and unenforceable, or is in the nature of liquidated damages and therefore valid.
Long before Bracton, this question came before Jewish courts for
determination and here likewise, judges and scholars were troubled. The
controversy surrounding this problem in the Talmud affords an excellent
example of the refinement of the legal reasoning of these men, many centuries ago.
At the very outset the Gemara5 9 raises the question in manner as follows: A and B enter into an agreement whereby A agrees to buy from B,
paying B earnest money, and saying: "If I retract, my pledge be forfeit to
you," and B says "If I retract; I will double your pledge."
It was the opinion of Rabbi Jose that the contract was good, and that
B, who breached the agreement, should pay double the amount according
"WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRAcrs 312-314 (1913).

Baba Kamma 58a
See Baba Mezia, Sonano, Glossary.
Baba Meza 48b
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to his contract. Rabbi Judah, however, disagreed, holding that A could
recover from B only up to the amount of the earnest money. The agreement to pay double the amount was called asmakhta, "a flaw," the term
"flaw" denoting invalidity and a non-binding obligation.
The following question was submitted for determination. Suppose A
gives B money to purchase wine for hun at the prevailing price during the
vintage season when wine is cheap and B negligently fails to do so. What
is B's liability? The contention of Rabbi Hama was B must supply A the
quantity of wine A's money would have purchased and suffer the loss
represented by the difference between the price of wine at the vintage
season when wine is plentiful and the price of wine out of season when it is
scarce and therefore higher. But he was overruled by Rab Ashi on the
ground that B's undertaking did not establish such a legal obligation. It
was an asmakhta, "a flaw," because the performance of B's contract to purchase wine in any event was dependent upon market conditions over which
B could have no control. To compel him to produce a specific quantity
of wine under such circumstances would be to impose a penalty upon him.
This could not have been his earnest or serious intention when he made
the agreement.60
The rationale of this rule, however, was put to the test and the case was
distinguished as will be seen from the following example. A, a tenant
farmer leased a field for planting under a crop-sharing arrangement, agreeing to pay the owner the estimated value of the latter's share if he failed to
do so. The tenant farmer permitted the field to lie fallow and it was ruled
that he must pay according to his agreement. The court held that the
promise here was not an asmakhta because it was in the tenant's power to
cultivate the land. He was free to do so without hindrance from anyone or
dependence upon anyone. The tenant farmer undertook the obligation
with serious intent to fulfill it and he was, therefore, required to perform.
Having failed to do so, he must pay the estimated loss. But the Talmud adds
that had the tenant farmer undertaken to pay 1,000 zuz, if he failed to cultivate, and if this amount were greater than the owner's actual loss, the agreement would not be valid. It would then be subject to the flaw of asmakhta
as being in the nature of a guzma, an exaggeration, and, therefore, not
seriously intended to be performed by him when he made the promise. 61
In other words, the promise would be in the nature of a penalty. Since the
tenant farmer had it in his power to cultivate the field and could, therefore,
fulfill his undertaking, he intended seriously to carry out his promise when
he made it. The wine dealer, on the other hand, could not seriously have
intended to carry out his undertaking for when he made the promise he
4Baba Mezia 73b

' Baba Mezia 104b
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knew that, in order to fulfill it; he would be required to purchase the wine
in the open market and this might be imapossible for him to do.
According to Rabbi Herzog 2 the dearest exposition of the
underlying principle of asmakhta was given by Rab Solomon ben Adereth
of Spain (1235-1310). It was his opinion that asmakhta applied when
the agreement to pay or forfeit something in the event of non-fulfillment
of an agreement was in the nature of a penalty. His rationale was based
upon a lack of the promisor's serious intention to bind himself legally when
he made the agreement; his promise to pay a penalty being merely collateral
to his primary undertaking. Since fulfillment rather than non-fulfillment
of his main purpose was intended, his carrying out the promise to pay an
additional sum in the event of non-fulfillment was dearly not intended and,
therefore, not binding upon him and so subject to asmakhta.
Our common law arrives fundamentally at the same condusion. For
underlying the phraseology that the law looks with disfavor upon penalties
and forfeitures is the rule of intent Our courts also look to the surrounding circumstances to discover the intention of the parties in order to determine the validity or non-validity of a promise to pay a stipulated sum in
the event of a breach of an agreement. The Supreme Court of the United
States so held in Sun Printing& Publishing Company v. Moore."5 Ohio has
adopted the same rule.
To determine whether a sum named in a contract is intended as a penalty or as liquidated damages, it is necessary to look to the whole instrument, its subject-matter, the ease or difficulty of measuring the breach in
damages, and the amount of the stipulated sum, not only as compared with
the value of the subject of the contract, but in proportion to the probable
consequences of the breach, and aiso to the intent of the parties ascertained

from the instrument itself in the light of the particular facts surrounding

the making and execution of the contract.
Whether a stipulation in any given case is to be regarded as penalty for
liquidated damages, becomes a question of intention to be reflected from
the whole instrument in connection with the subject-matter. The form in
which the stipulation is clothed may be considered, but is not conclusive.

In final analysis, the stipulation for damages must be read and considered
along with all other provisions, the general scope and subject-matter of the
contract, from which must be determined whether the parties intended
thereby to fix a fair and just amount for the actual damages, likely to arise,
or an ordinary amount as mere penalty to secure performance.'
This doctrine of asmakhta was fraught with important consequences to
the laws of commerce and trade. It will be noted in the examples of asmakhta above given that each agreement which is subject to the flaw of
asmalthta contains the element of a condition precedent Conditions prece2 HERzoG, MAIN INSTITU=iONS OF JEWISH LAW 85 (1936).
,183 U. S. 642, 22 Sup. Ct. 240 (1901).
"Jones v. Stevens, 112 Ohio St. 43, 146 N.E. 894 (1925).
'Jacobs v. Shannon Furniture Co., 13 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 140, 141 (1910).
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dent were not recognized in Jewish Law -"No 'if' is binding. ' 5a But conditions subsequent were recognized in Jewish Law. 5 b Ingenious devices
were invented to avoid the "flaw," so as to permit the easier flow of commerce. These mediums became accepted practice among Jewish merchants
during the Middle Ages and were ultimately adopted by their Christian
neighbors among whom they lived. One such method introduced by Jewish
merchants was the following: A would declare that he owed B a sum certain, which included an amount in excess of the actual sum borrowed. B
would agree that if A paid a fixed portion thereof, by a definite date, the
balance, would be reduced in amount to the extent of the excess; but if A
failed to make the payment as agreed upon, he would be required to pay the
full amount he originally promised. By this method the obligation of A was
absolute but the waiver of B was. conditional and the entire arrangement
was valid for the law of asmakhta was not applicable to releases and defeasances, since releases and defeasances were based upon conditions subse8
quent.
The application of this principle may be found in our daily use in the
law of negotiable instruments today. The increased rate of interest, usually
from five per cent to eight per cent, upon default in the payment of one
installment of interest, provided for in a promissory note, is a pattern
familiar to most of us. Many notes carry promises which inverse the process. They provide for the payment of eight per cent interest and reduce
it to five per cent if the maker or promisor pays the note promptly according to its tenor. But, considerable litigation was required to establish the
negotiability of promissory notes containing such provisions. The attack
was generally founded upon the "sum certain" clause of Section 2 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law.
The reason for upholding the negotiability of an instrument containing
such provisions furnishes us with an interesting observation of the close
resemblance between this aspect of negotiable instruments and asmakhta.
Brannan6 gives the following as the reason: "Since the additional interest
comes only after default the sum is sufficiently certain." We have seen that
in Jewish law the primary obligation is valid and not subject to the rule of
asmakhta since the additional promise could take effect only upon the
non-occurrence of the condition, namely, the payment of the obligation
undertaken by the debtor.
Professor Jacob J. Rabinowitz finds evidence of the principle of asmadta inherent in our present form of mortgage. 6 The underlying prin'aBaba Mezia 66b
11b Ilbt.
Maimonides Yad Mekhlra XI, 18.
BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAw 234 (7th ed. 1948)
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ciple of our present day mortgage is that the conveyance made by the
mortgagor is a deed absolute, upon condition, however, that should the
mortgagor pay the obligation secured thereby, the conveyance becomes
void. The intention of the mortgagor, when he conveys his land to the
mortgagee, is to pay the obligation secured by the mortgage and not to
make the conveyance of his property absolute; his prime purpose is to fulfill his obligation rather than default. Inherent in this method of mortgaging is the principle of forfeit if the mortgagor defaults. In that event
two things are left for him to do, (1) redeem the property by paying the
obligation, or (2) obtain from the proceeds realized from the sale of the
property at public sale whatever amount his equity of redemption may
bring over and above the indebtedness and costs. There is involved
in this process the feature of redemption. The correlative of redemption is forfeiture. The origin of this mode of security stems from the
early English method of placing two deeds or documents in the hands of a
depositary to be delivered to one of the persons, either to the creditor upon
the non-fulfillment of the obligation, or to the debtor upon the fulfillment
of his undertaking. This device was commonly used among Jewish merchants in Spain in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and even earlier to
avoid asmakhta. It was also employed by Jewish merchants in England in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and subsequently by non-Jewish merchants of that era in England as a means of securing obligations of debtors.
The following example from the Exchequer of the Jews is cited by Mr.
Rabinowitz: "Gilbert de Pelham attached to answer to William de S. in a
plea of detention of a start (Jewish form of deed) The said William complains that whereas a starr in which it was contained that if he paid to Abraham, son of Ben, a Jew, at the feast of All Saints last past, 10 marks, then
he should be quit of a debt of 20 pounds in which he was bound to the
said Jew, was handed over under his seal to Gilbert to be kept, the aforesaid
Gilbert delivered it to the said Jew fraudulently and maliciously to William's damage of 20 pounds." 9
In support of his thesis that this method is evident in our present day
form of mortgage, Mr. Rabinowitz says: "It is to be noted here that in this
case, as in most cases of its kind, the starr of acquittance was delivered to
a third party in 'equal hands,' a procedure which as we have seen above was
characteristic of such transactions among the Jews as well as of the classical
English mortgage in the earliest stage of development." 70 He cites another
instance of an agreement for the sale of timber, the performance of which
' Rabinowitz, The Common Law Mortgage and the Condition4 Bond, 92 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 179 (1943).
0lb d. at 187.
-0Ibu.
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reads as follows: "And for the faithful performance of the said agreement,
he, Michael, made the said Jew a charter for 20 pounds and caused it to
be placed in the Cambridge Chirograph Chest, on condition, nevertheless,
that if he, Michael, should deliver the said tmber to the said Jew at the
terms aforesaid, then he should be quit of the said charter of 20 pounds."'"
Here is exemplified the old Jewish method of avoiding asmakhta by
inserting the penalty provision in the agreement proper as a condition subsequent. By the middle of the fourteenth century, the employment of two
deeds to secure an obligation became the adopted mode of procedure in
England. It was not until the fifteenth century that the single instrument
contaiung both the obligation and the defeasance clause came into use in
England. Many of our states employed the old English method until recent
times. There are numerous recorded cases throughout the United States in
which courts of equity were called upon to declare deeds absolute on their
face as being held by the creditors merely as security for the payment of
obligations.
Mr. Rabinowitz is continuing his research in this field and his findings,
as heretofore stated, will be presented in a book soon to be published. One
chapter thereof appears in Vol. XII, No. 4 Jewish Social Studies (October
1950) In it he traces Jewish influences on Lombard law. His findings
disclose that the Lombards also used this method of securing a debt as early
as the eleventh century, and that its origin is traceable to Talmudic law.
The Lombardy mortgages contained a provision which required the creditor
to return to the maker the instrument of conveyance securing the obligation
This mode of cancelling
"Incisum, capsatum, taliatum" - that is, cancelled.
72
Talmud.
the
in
prescribed
is
legal instruments
It is of more than passing interest that in this same passage in the Talmud is contained the distinction between intentional and unintentional
cancellation of instruments which reads with striking similarity when compared with Section 123 of the Negotiable Instruments Law and the decisions applicable thereto.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

"At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a release. And this is
the manner of the release. Every creditor shall release that which he has
lent unto his neighbor; he shall not exact it of his neighbor and his brother;
because the Lord's release hath been proclaimed.17 3 We find here the earliest promulgation of a statute of limitations. This passage in Deuteronomy
is one of several which prompted Geo. Foot Moore74 to characterize much
"Ibud. n. 30.
' Baba Bathra 168b
"Deuteronomy 15:1-11.
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of rabbinical jurisprudence as idealistic in character and as being "an inheritance from the Law and the Prophets." According to Moore, the law
was not for the Jewish doctors of the law a volume of statutes on all kinds of
subjects. It was, he says, "a revelation of God's ideals for men's conduct
and character." 75
But we find in the Mishnah that 'The seventh year cancels any loan
whether it is secured by bond or not. It does not cancel debts due to ai
shopkeeper." ' Mishnaic limitations upon the sweeping Deuteronomic
pronouncement became necessary to avoid a burdensome impingement
upon trade. For this purpose Hillel created the Prozbol, which was a written
and recorded declaration by the creditor, signed by witnesses, made in a
court of law, to the effect that he did not intend to relinquish his claim
under the terms of the seven year law, by leaving the debt with the court
and in the court's prerogative. The form reads as follows: "I transmit to
you, the judges of this court, that touching any debt due me, I shall be permitted to collect it whensover I will"77 This recorded instrument tolled
the seven year limitation.
TmNSFER OF LANS

Space forbids more than perfunctory mention of the law pertaining to
the transfer of lands in Jewish jurisprudence. It may seem strange for us to
learn that Jewish law did not permit the sale of agricultural lands n fee
simple. Such lands were entailed to the heirs of those to whom they were
originally allotted in the division of lands and reverted to them at the end
of every forty-nine years and during the fiftieth year in accordance with
the law of jubilees.
And thou shalt number seven Sabbaths of years unto thee seven times
seven years; and these shall be unto thee the days of seven Sabbaths of
and ye shall hallow the 50th year and
years, even forty and nine years
proclaim liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof. A
jubilee shall the 50th year be unto you. In the year of jubilee ye shall reaccording to the number of years
turn every man unto his possessions
after the jubilee thou shalt buy of thy neighbor and according unto the
number of years or the crops he shall sell unto thee.'
All that could be transferred, therefore, was tantamount to a leasehold in
such lands for a term of years no longer than the jubilee year and the price
to be paid therefor was based on the number of years remaining from the

date of purchase to the date of the next jubilee. It may be of interest to
students and lawyers to learn that the phrase "be the same more or less,"
"2 MOORE, JUDAISm 145 (1944).
"ibui.
"Shebiith 101
"Shebiith 108
"Leviticus 25: 8-25.
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which appears in the usual deed of conveyance as mere matter of form, may
be found in the Mishnah.7 9
If he said, 'I will sell thee a kor's space of soil as measured by the line
and he gave him any less, the buyer may reduce the price; and if he gave
him any more the buyer must give this back. But if he said, "Be it less or
more, even if he gave the buyer a quarter-kab's space less in every seah's
space or a quarter-kab's space more in every seah's space, it becomes
his.

To effect a transfer of real estate (karka) one of the following three
prime methods could be employed:
1. Keseph- By paying the purchase price or part thereof;
2. Shetar- By a writing, a deed, which contained witnesses to its execution (generally two) by the vendor, and a delivery thereof to the

vendee:
3. Hazakah - By the purchaser going upon the land and performing
some act thereon which could be construed as an act of benefit to the
land or to the vendee, as for instance, the cutting of weeds on the land,
locking, fencing or effecting an opening.'

The English "livery of seizin" resembles closely this form of Jewish
transfer.
A feud or fee was created or transferred by a deed of feoffment with
'livery of seizin.' The ceremony of 'livery of seizin' consisted in the feoffor
and feoffee going on the land to be conveyed and the delivery to the feoffee
of a glove, knife, rod or other object on the land as a symbolical delivery
of the land itself.'

Indeed the foregoing sounds almost exactly like Kinyan Suddar or like
the passage from the Book of Ruth. The law of conveyance of land by
deed with witnesses dates back to Jeremiah 32:44 where it is said: "Man
shall buy fields for money and subscribe the deeds and sell them and procure
evidence of witnesses." The requirements for witnesses, where their signatures are to appear to avoid misuse and misunderstanding, the form of the
deed, the concluding clause "firm and established," erasures harmless or
invalidating, are fully treated and analyzed in the Talmud.
Much space is given to two kinds of deeds: (1) plain and (2) folded.
The requirements for a plain deed are quite simple: all the writing
must appear on one side of the document and the witnesses' signatures on
the remaining unwritten portion of the deed but on the inside of the paper.8 2
Tis is quite reminiscent of the law in Ohio which until recently required
the signature of the notary to appear upon the instrument and at such part
thereof as contained something more than the formal language of the attestation.
, Baba Bathra 72
8 Kiddushin 26a, Baba Bathra 52b
" 1 WALsH, PROPERTY 134 (2d ed. 1947)
'-.Baba Bathra 160a
Ifbid.
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In a folded or more formal deed the requirement is that the writing
appear on alternate lines only. Each written line is to be folded over the
blank line adjacent to it and each successive two are stitched together. Each
fold must bear on its external upper side the signature of a different witness,
the number of folds not to exceed the number of witnesses.8 3 In a folded
deed at least three witnesses are required. In a plain deed the minimum of
two are required 4
Adverse possession (Hazakah) is a subject too vast to treat here. Suffice
it to say that the requirement in the Talmud is that the possession by the
squatter of a cornfield be open, notorious and adverse for a period of three
years if he is to acquire tide by adverse possession. According to Rabbi
Akiba it was enough if he retained possession for one month during the
first year, an entire twelve months during the second year, and one month
in the third year.85 But if he occupied a field planted with trees, gathered
in his olives, and chilled his figs, even though it be all done in one year, he
obtained title because it is presumed that no owner would permit all this to
take place upon his land without inquiry and protest.88

THE LAw oF BAmnTS
The Judiac basic law of bailments is found in Exodus 22:6-14. The
Mishnah17 classifies bailees into four groups, as follows:
a. A gratuitous bailee - shomer hinam,
b. A borrower - shoel,
c. A paid bailee- nose sakhar,
d. A hirer- sokher.
The law concerning formation and termination of bailments, evidence pertaming thereto and kindred subjects form an interesting study indeed, but
I shall concern myself very briefly merely with the liability of bailees.
THE LBmLIiS oF BAILEES
1. A gratuitous bailee.
The Gemara, in commenting upon the liability of each of the four
categories, reduces the liabilities to three, but retains the four categories,
placing the liabilities of the hirer (sokher) and the paid bailee (nose sakhar) on the same level. 88 The gratuitous bailee is liable for negligence
only. His responsibility may be compared to the liability of one failing to
use ordinary care at common law. The shomer hinam owes the duty of
Ibid.
T

Baba Bathra 28a
NIbid.
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preserving the property in the "manner of bailees" (b'dereh hashomrim).
Accordingly, therefore, an unpaid bailee may take an oath that he has kept
the object bailed in the way of bailees (b'dereh hashomram) and be absolved
from liability in every case. 9 The "way of bailees" is defined by enumerating the manner in which various objects are to be kept.
Thus, if the object bailed is money, whether sealed or loose, and it is left
with a private person for safekeeping, the bailee is expected to secure it in
a safe place in his house. If he fails to do so and the object is lost, he is
liable for he did not guard the bailment in the manner of baileesP0 or, in the
language of the common law, "he failed to use the care ordinarily and customarily used by prudent persons in the same or similar circumstances." If
the bailee is a banker and the money is given to him loose, he may commingle it with his own funds. He, therefore, is liable for the loss whether
he commingles the money or not, because he has the right to commingle.
If the money is given to him "bound up" by the bailor and he so keeps it,
he is absolved from liability in the event of loss. Should the banker unseal
the container or whatever may be the receptacle in which the money is kept,
he is liable in the event of loss.91 If the article left is a garment, the bailee is
held to no more care than keeping it in his house. If the bailment be
jewelry or precious stones, it must be kept in a secure place such as a strong
box in his house. If it is some heavy object such as lumber, the bailee sufficiently complies with "the way of bailees" if he keeps the same in his open
yard.92
If the bailee places the bailor's money in the same place as his own
and both are stolen, but the place of safekeeping is not as required by the
law of bailments (b'dereh hashomrim) the bailee is liable, for the law declares that while one may take risks with his own property, he cannot do
so with the property of another. 3 This principle goes beyond what seems
to be the law in Ohio, although there has been much discussion on this subject. The editors of Ohio Jurisprudence, however, state the rule to be almost exactly as it appears in the Talmud:
The depository however is not exempt from liability for gross negligence merely because he has kept the deposit in the same place where or
with the same care that he has kept his own property.

The gratuitous bailee, however, must be free of negligence in making
secure the property upon receiving it. Thus, if he was negligent in the
Ibid.
Baba Mezia 42a
'*

Baba Mezia 43a

Maimonides, She'ela U'Pikadon IV, 2.
Baba Mezia 42b
"5 Ohio Jur. 110, citing Griffith v. Zipperwick, 28 Ohio St. 388 (1876).
'2

THE TALMUD

1951]

first instance and the bailment was lost in some manner other than
through such negligent act, the bailee is liable.
By way of example, the Talmud speaks of a case in which a man deposited money for safekeeping with his neighbor, who placed the same in
a shack built of reeds (a fowler's trap) whence it was stolen. It was held
that although the bailee used ordinary care in secreting the money in a
place where no one would normally look for it, nevertheless, the place of
safekeeping was insecure. The bailee should have anticipated that a shack
made of bulrushes might burn. He was therefore negligent in depositing
another's money in such a place for safekeeping. Since he was negligent
ab initto, the fact that the money was stolen rather than lost through burning did not absolve him.
The bailee may not redeposit with another the object left with hin
for safekeeping. If he does, he is liable to the bailor for the loss, if any
is suffered, because, having given up possession of the article, the bailee
cannot take the oath that he has kept it in the way of bailees, and the bailor
cannot be required to rely upon an oath from a person in whom he himself has not placed confidence- namely, the substitute. The original
bailee has committed a breach of trust. But the bailee may entrust the
articles to his mother, his wife, and his children, for they enjoy his confidence as a matter of course. If he swears that he has entrusted the bailed
articles for safekeeping to such persons and the person thus entrusted
with them swears that the articles were securely placed, "that she
(mother) had placed the money in her work basket," the bailee is absolved from loss thereof. 8
2.

The borrower - shoel.

The liability of the borrower is almost that of an insurer. The cause
of his failure to return the property bailed makes no difference. He is
liable for the loss of the property resulting even from an act of God. Once
return is impossible, the Shoel becomes liable.9 7 Harsh as this may seem,
the Talmud gives an excellent reason for this view. The rationale is that
this bailee should be made so liable because he receives full benefit of the
object bailed, since he makes use or may make use of the property which
he borrowed.9 8 One exception, however, should be noted. When the
bailee borrows an animal for labor and the animal dies due to work, the
bailee is not liable. The language of the Talmud is very picturesque and
definitive, "
but even if it died through work, he is still not liable be'Baba Mezia 42a
"Baba Mezia 42a, 42b
" Baba Mezia 93b, Baba Kamma Ilb

" Baba Mezia

94b
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cause he can say, 'I did not borrow it that it should stand in a show
case.' 99 The idea is that since the work done by the animal was in contemplation of both the borrower and the lender, the death of the animal
must also have been in their contemplation. Both the Mishna and the
Gemara are quick, however, to make an exception here, declaring that if
the animal should die of cruel treatment by the borrower he is hable. 100
"I did not borrow it that it should stand in a show case" is another
way of saying that when the parties entered into the bailment it was intended that the bailed article would be reasonably fit for the use the
bailee intended to make of it.
3. A paid bailee - nose sakhar.
A perutah (farthing), almost anything of value, is sufficient to create
the obligation of the nose sakhar.1' 1 This bailee is held to a very high
degree of care, for in the days of ancient Israel, he was generally a shepherd. He is liable for all loss except such as occurs through an act of God.
The destruction of his flock or the loss of a portion thereof by a pack of
wolves or by armed robbers is considered an act of God.
It is of interest to note how the Talmud treats this subject. The
bailee, if he be a shepherd, is expected to drive off one wolf but if the
attack is made by two or more wolves he is absolved from liability, for he
is not required to place his own life in jeopardy to save the flock. For
the same reason the shepherd is likewise excused from loss resulting from
1 2
-armed robbers.
4. A hirer - sokher.
The sokher is liable in all cases in which the hired keeper is liable.
He is looked upon as a paid bailee for he also gets the greatest benefit
from the bailment by virtue of the fact that he makes use of the owner's
property. This bailee is excused from liability if the loss occurs as a result of an attack by robbers who overcome his resistance or if he is so put
in fear as to be unable to withstand the threat against him. 10
A comparison of the foregoing with Ohlo law may be of some interest
here. Ohio divides bailments into three classes, designating three categories of liability1. Such as are for the sole benefit of the bailor,
2. Such as are for the sole benefit of the bailee;
3. Such as are for the benefit of both.'
"Baba Mezia 96b
"®BabaMezia 710
"' Shakh (Sifte Kohen) Hoshen Mishpat 3031
"' Baba Mezia 29b

Ibid.
1045 Ohio Jur. 99.
IM
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While the liability of the gratuitous bailee is for gross negligence, nevertheless the language the Ohio Supreme Court used in defining the degree
of care of a gratuitous bailee is remarkable in its proximity to the language of the Talmud. In Giffith v. Zipperwck'015 the court said:
The degree of care due from the depository depends upon circumstances such as the nature and quality of the goods bailed and the character
and custom of the place where they are kept.

The editors of Ohio Jurisprudence in treating this subject say -106
If the bailor expects the property to be put m a certain place and the
bailee knows of his expectations, he ought to put it in that place or notify
the bailee is bound to place the property
the bailor that he cannot do so
where he has reason to believe the bailor expects it to be placed.
TORTS

I.
The laws of liability arising from failure to perform a duty or obligation imposed upon a person regardless of his own will or undertaking, are
well defined in the Talmud. They are found primarily in the Talmudic
tractate Baba Kamma (First Gate) in the order Nezikan (Damages)
The Tractate opens with the Mishnah dividing into four categories the
primary sources of damage, as follows:
1. The ox (goring ox).

2. The pit.
3. The chewer (spoliator or grazer).
4. Fire.
Of these the Mishnah says:
The feature common to all of them is that they are in the habit of
doing damage and that they have to be under your control, so that wherever
any one of them does damage, the offender is liable to indemnify from

the best of his land mt°
From these "principle categories," the Gemara deduces derivative liabilities.
The words "ox, pit, chewer and fire" are all symbolic terms. "Ox,"
for example does not necessarily apply to damage done by an ox only.
The legal principles derived therefrom are applied to the law pertaining
to domesticated animals generally and, from the doctrines so derived, laws
are promulgated which in some instances are applicable to govern the
conduct of humans also. 08 The derivatives from "pit" may be a stone,
128 Ohio St 388, 401 (1876).
'05 Ohio Jur. 110.

"Baba Kamma 11
' Baba Kamna 84a
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knife, luggage or any other object left or placed in the public highway, or
any obstruction which creates a nuisance or causes damage.109
H.
Tam and Mu'ad.
The "ox," according to Rab Judah's view in the Gemara, refers to
damage 1 done
by "horn," while the "chewer" refers to damage done by
"tooth." 0 According to the interpretation in the Gemara, the "chewer"
category includes damage done by "foot" as well as "tooth" and is derived
from the Mishnaic generalization, "Whenever damage has occurred the
offender is liable.""'
This is a figurative way of spelling out liability for damage resulting
from acts of ordinary trespass, viciousness or both on the part of domesticated animals. Acts of damage committed by an animal by "tooth" or
"foot" (b'shen v'regel) are treated as ordinary trespass for which Jewish
law affords redress akin to our own method of awarding damages for
such acts. "Horn" on the other hand connotes the doing of malicious
mischief.
The Gemara elucidates by explaining that the derivatives of "horn"
are collision, biting and kicking. At first glance, it would seem that these
are odd derivatives of "horn" and would perhaps more properly be categorized as derivatives of "foot" and "tooth." Yet, this is not so. For
what this symbolic language means is that an ox or any other domesticated
animal which causes damage by "biting," for example, indicates vicious
proclivities. The biting of the ox is here distinguished from the normal
use which an animal makes of its teeth for feeding and grazing, which are
the natural propensities of all beasts. "Biting," in the sense used here,
connotes a purpose to do hurt rather than to fulfill natural physical needs,
'' 2
such as feeding, from which the animal obtains "gratification." "
Where an animal does damage on another's land by "tooth" or "foot"
(b'shen v'regel) the animal is said to be mu'ad ab initio, and its owner
must respond in full for the resulting damage"13 when failing to guard
such animal properly."' The owner is under obligation fully to expect
this and since the animal is in his possession and under his control, he
must answer for its acts. The Mishnah is very illuminating here. The
language has an exceedingly familiar modern ring.
Baba Kamma 6a
...
"'Baba Kamma 2b, 3b, 4a, 9b

SBaba Kamma 49

..Baba Kamma 2b
2
' Baba Kamma 15b, 9b
'4 Baba Kamma 55b
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Whenever I am under an obligation of controlling (anything in my
possession) I am considered to have perpetrated any damage that may result. When I am to blame for a part of the damage, I am liable to compensate for the same as ifI had perpetrated the whole of the damage.'

A question in Jewish law arises here as to whether one who has
animals under his control is under strict liability for the acts of trespass of his domesticated animals or whether the liability arises from the
negligence of the owner in failing to guard the cattle properly.
The language of Maimonides is as follows:
The owner is liable to pay for the acts of every living being under his
control which causes damage, because his property caused damage."'

This might seem to show that the liability of the owner is strict and arises
from the mere ownership of the animal rather than from the negligence
of the owner. This would parallel the common law concept of strict liability. But, Jewish law even according to this Maimoniden concept of
liability gives the owner of the animal a defense if he guards properly
against its trespassing." 7 However, the burden of proving proper guarding is placed upon the owner.
Damage caused by an animal while in motion, such as falling upon
something or dragging things by its hair, or with its harness, or with the
load upon it, is placed in the category of "foot."1 8 Acts of damage such
as where an animal breaks a wall or fence by leaning or rubbing against
it, or trampling upon or damaging fruit or produce, are placed in the
category of "tooth."
Injuries resulting from "horn," that is from goring or any of its derivatives are not to be completely anticipated by the owner until the antmal is declared mu'ad for they are the products of excitement or the result of the inherently vicious nature of a particular animal of a species
usually not vicious." 9 If the goring is done by an animal that is tam
(innocent, harmless), one which has not been declared an "attested danger," (mu'ad), half damages are assessed against the owner, and only out
of the body of the tort-feasant animaL" If, however, the goring is done
by an animal which is mu'ad, witnessed against, full payment must be
made by its owner out of the best of his estate, for he should have foreseen the act completely. But, he does not pay full damages until the ox
has done his fourth goring.' 2' A showing by the owner that he had propBaba Kamma 9b

Nizke Mamon 11.
"'Baba Kamma 55b; maimonides, Nizke Manion 41
"'Baba, Kamma 3a
Baba Kamma 5b
"Baba Bathra 16b

' Baba Bathra 28k
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erly guarded the animal is availgble to him as a defense in cases of tam
and mu'ad as well as in cases of tooth and foot.
Mishnaic distinction between "tam" and "mu'ad" considerably softened
the Biblical pronouncement against the goring ox, which is as follows:
And if one man's ox hurt another's so that it die, then they shall sell
the live ox and divide the price of it and the dead also they shall divide.
Or if it be known that the ox was wont to gore in time past and its owner
hath not kept it in, he shall surely pay ox for ox and the dead beast shall
be his own.'

The basic doctrine underlying the principle of "mu'ad" is scienter.
Since the owner is not required to anticipate completely the vicious acts
of a domesticated animal, his full liability for such of its acts can arise
only if it has been declared vicious and its owner has been forewarned.
The Talmud says that an animal becomes mu'ad if its owner has been
warned in a court of law by the testimony of witnesses given in his pres23
ence that the animal has been seen to gore on three successive occasions.1
Jewish law placed great importance upon this judicial proceeding. The
animal was on trial, but the owner was also on trial, for not only was the
owner of a mu'ad which gored required to pay full damages if he had
failed to guard it properly, but if it killed a human being, the owner, as
well as the animal, was to be put to death.' 24 The owner, by paying a
ransom could redeem his life. The ox could not be ransomed. 125 The
law attributed so much importance to the requirement for this judical
inquiry in the presence of the owner that if warning was given in open
court when the owner was not present, or was given to the owner but not
in a court of justice, the animal could not be declared legally mu'ad.22
Since an ox which gores a human being to death must be destroyed
and its flesh may not be eaten 127 what of a stadium ox? The Tannaim
took cognizance of this means of goring human beings to death in "sport,"
and exempted the stadium ox from the death penalty completely, saying:
In the case of a stadium ox (killing a person), the death penalty is
not imposed (upon the ox) as it is written: 'If an ox gore, excluding cases
where it is goaded to gore.'"

At this point it might be well to compare with Jewish law our present
m

Exodus 21:3.
Baba Kamma 24a

'

' Exodus 21.29. Death of the human being referred to here is interpreted by the
Gemara as a divine penalty which cannot be imposed by a court of human beings.
Sanhedrin 33a
' Exodus 21.29, 30.
m

' Baba Kamma 24a
'Exodus 21.29.
'Baba Kamma 39a
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day law dealing with the subject of harm done by animals.
Cooley says the following:

Professor

The reason why the common law makes the owner of domestic animals
responsible for such injuries as have already been specified, is because, taking notice of their propensities, it is his duty to anticipate that they will
He must
commit them as opportunity offers, and to guard against it
take notice of the natural propensity of cattle to stray and trample down
crops, as one who keeps a beast of prey must take notice that he will kill
and destroy animals and human beings if he is suffered to escape.
But there are other mischiefs which may be committed by domestic
animals that one is under no obligation to anticipate and guard against,
because they are not the result of a general propensity, but are committed,
if at all, by exceptionally vicious individuals of the particular species of
animals. Thus, though every horse will roam into neighboring fields if
not restrained from doing so, it is only in rare and exceptional cases that
a horse will attack and injure those who come near him. Therefore, while
the owner should anticipate and protect against trespasses on lands by his
horses, he is under no moral obligation to anticipate that a horse in which
no such disposition has been discovered will suddenly make an assault upon
and kick and bite some passer-by who chances to come within his reach.
For this reason the keeper of a domestic animal is not in general responsible for any mischief that may be done by such animal which was of a kind
not to be expected from him, and which it would not be negligence in the
keeper to fail to guard against.
If it be made to appear that any domestic animal is vicious and
accustomed to do hurt, and that the owner has been notified, or has knowledge of the fact, a duty is then imposed upon him to keep the animal secure, and he is responsible for the mischief done by the animal in consequence of the failure to observe this duty. To recover the plaintiff must
prove both that the animal was vicious and that the defendant had notice of
the fact. If the defendant had no notice of the vicious propensities of the
animal he is not liable.

I.
"Half Damages

.

Out of the Body."

What is the difference (in law) between tam and mu'ad? In the case
of tam only half damages are paid and only out of the body (of the tortfeasant cattle), whereas in the case of mu-ad, full payment is made out of
t
the best (of the estate).

The words "out of the body" caused considerable discussion and required much interpretation. The Mishnah says:
If an ox (tam) of the value of 100 zuz has gored an ox of the value of
200 zuz and the carcass had no value at all, the plaintiff will take possession of the (defendant's) ox (that did the damage) ,'

According to Rabbi Ishmael, the tort-feasant ox is to be appraised by a
court of law and the plaintiff becomes a creditor of the defendant, having
only a monetary claim against him. Rabbi Akiba, however, was of the
' 2 COOLEY, TORTS 304 (4th ed. 1932).
iBaba Kamma 16b
SBaba Kamma 33a.
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opinion that the body of the ox becomes transferred to the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff and the defendant become owners in common of the tortfeasant ox. Subsequent rulings upheld Rabbi Akiba's view.
Thus we find that where A's ox, a tam, gored B's, each animal being of
the value of 200 zuz, and the carcass of B's ox was valueless, it was held
that A and B became partners in the live ox, each owning half.132 In
order to make clear the intent of the law that the payment be made out of
the body of the animal, this further example is given: Later, A's same ox
gores C's ox, valued at 200 zuz. The carcass of C's ox is of no value. The
rule is that C becomes half owner of the live ox and A and B share equally
the other half interest.
This whole process might, at first, seem strange and primitive to
present-day students of the law of torts, but upon closer study one can see
here the exemplification of the humaneness of Jewish law. The significance of the payment of half damages in the case of a goring by a tam is
that the payment is considered in the nature of a penalty, or rather as a
warning to the owner of the animal, and not as compensation to the
plaintiff for the damage he may have sustained. And this, as will be
seen, is a manifestation of the concern of Jewish law for the protection
of life and property. In the opinion of Rab Huna average cattle can so
far control themselves that they will not gore. This being so, their owner
need not expect them to gore, and in strict justice should not be required
to pay anything at all if they start goring. However, since the ox did
gore, the ox is suspect; but it is forgiven for it is still tain, but the owner
must be warned to watch his cattle so that a like occurrence will not again
take place. Rab Huna, therefore, arrives at the conclusion that the payment of half damages is in the nature of a fine against the owner as a
deterrent and not compensation to the plaintiff: "Divine law imposed
upon him a fine in case of damage so that additional care should be taken
of cattle." 1 3 Rab Papa, on the other hand, contended that all animals
are presumptively unsafe. The owner, therefore, is on notice ab smtio
and should, in accordance with strict justice, respond in civil damages in
all events where injury is done by his cattle. Nevertheless, Rab Papa indicates the magnificence of the Jewish concept of law as being justice
tempered with mercy. He says:
Strict justice should therefore demand full payment in case of damage.
It was only Divine law that exercised mercy and released half payment on
account of the fact that the cattle have not yet become mu'ad."

Historians of English law trace the law of deodands to the Talmudic
l"Hoshen Mishpat 401.

'nBaba Kamma 15a
"4

hi id.
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law of half damages "out of the body." Holdsworth says that "until 1846
the law in England was such that the instrument which by its motion
caused death was forfeit to the Crown as a deodand." 36 He says that for
a long period in English History, the idea prevailed that compensation
for damage done by domestic animals could be made only by giving up
the anmal, and attributes this to Judaic influence: "But sometimes the
Anglo-Saxon courts represent the primitive ideas of the Old Testament
rather than the primitive ideas of the Teutomc race."'3 6 Blackstone
likewise attributes the law of deodands to the Mosaic law. 37 He enumerates some of these deodands, such as wheels, carts, swords, and even
ships plying fresh waters.
In Pollock and Maitland"18 a case is cited in which a man was killed
by his own cart. The price of the owner's cart, which caused his death,
was given to his children "pro Deo." And where a boat damaged a
bridge at Tewksbury, the price of the boat was devoted "for God's sake"
to the repair of the bridge." 9
To this day, the principle of the law of deodands is evident in AngloAmerican jurisprudence, for in admiralty law the action for damage done by
a ship is in the form of a libel against the ship. In the case of Malek
Adhel, which was a suit involving a libel against a vessel, Justice Story
quotes, with approval, the following passage:
The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the
offense is primarily attached to the thing."'

NEGLIGENCE
Liability for one's own acts of negligent conduct isthoroughly treated
in the Talmud. The Mishnah exemplifies, rather than defines, negligence
through a series of colorful and very expressive illustrations, one of which
may suffice for our purpose.
If a man brings sheep into a shed and locks the door in front of them
properly but the sheep, nevertheless, get out and do damage, he is not

liable. If, however, he does not lock the door in front of them properly,

he is Rable"
The Gemara interprets "properly' as follows:
If the door was able to stand against a normal wind, it would be
' 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 46 (3d ed. 1922).
'"2 HoLnswORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 47 (3d ed. 1922).
See also, HoLMsm, CoMMON LAw 15, 24-27 (1881).
11T1 BL. COMML 0300.
1132 POLLACK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 472, note
1895), citing Northumberland Assize Rolls, 96.

'lbuh.
"'2 Howard (43 U.S.) 210, 234 (1844).
14t
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'properly,' but if the door could not stand against a normal wind, that
would be 'not properly.'

Here we have it -an age-old problem as new today as it was old approximately two thousand years ago.
The Tannain and Amoraim evidently experienced as much difficulty
with the concepts of "care," "ordinary care," and "lack of care," as we do
today. Their conclusions, however, parallel ours very closely. Prosser
defines negligence as:
Conduct falling below the standard established by law for the protecton of others against unreasonable risk of harm '

The Talmudic scholars obtained the same result in different form. In the
interpretation of "proper," above given, the standard of care is whether
the door was firm enough to withstand the pressure of a normal wind. If
the door conformed to that standard, the conduct of the man placing the
sheep in the shed was reasonable and proper. If the door could not withstand the pressure of a normal wind, it fell below the standard of reasonableness and was, therefore, improper. Again, if the door could not
withstand the pressure of an extraordinary wind, the man's conduct was
still proper, for failing to equip his shed with doors which would meet
such a test would not be subjecting the property of others to unreasonable
risk of harm.
It is to be hoped that the mere glimpse of the principle given here
may serve to illustrate how well Jewish courts and scholars understood
this problem, and how dearly they posited an answer to the need for indicating standards of human conduct, which are virtually imponderable.
Except through laying down arbitrary rules for specific situations and
specifying that such are the standards of conduct binding upon everybody irrespective of the circumstances in the particular case, who can say
what act of anyone is proper or improper at any given time or place?
The best we can do is to point the way by example. This method of
teaching used by the great Talmudic scholars, namely that of giving
simple unforgettable examples to illustrate abstract principles is among
the highest expressions of the gemus of these men. To make concrete
that which is abstract makes easier and more certain the grasp and thorough
understanding of a principle which may otherwise remain abstruse. By
doing so the concept is no longer in the clouds but is brought down to
earth within the reach of every normal human being. What people
thoroughly understand, if it meets with their approval, they will adhere
to. If they adhere to it, they will generally support it. What people do
not understand they either fear or dislike, and, in any event, resent and
142Ibul.

...
PRossER, ToRTs 175 (1941).
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refuse to accept. Talmudic teachers evidently understood this principle
well. Because they so understood it, they labored among themselves to
distill abstract theoretical principles of law, obtain therefrom the very
essence of each principle and clothe the result in a simple understandable
example. They understood that the law was promulgated not merely for
scholastics or for lawyers but for the guidance of the people, all the people, not merely a segment thereof. Their conception of the law was
something more than a set of abstract rules; it was rather a guide and a
way of life. They brought the law to a level which all men could understand and to a standard by which all men could be guided. By the simple
example of the sheep in the shed and the capacity of the door to withstand
the pressure of a normal wind, Jewish scholars brought to earth, in concrete form, an abstract legal principle within the reasonable comprehension of normal human beings.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

The subject of contributory negligence is treated in Baba Kamma 23b,
24b. Limitations of space preclude citing more than one example. After
defimng tam and mu'ad, the Mishnah says that animals once having been
declared mu'ad may become tam again, "when children keep on touching
them and no goring results."'" The Gemara, in interpreting the Mishnah,
poses the question whether an inference may not be drawn from this that
if goring resulted the owner would be liable, even though the ox was incited to gore by the children. It answers by laying down the rule that if
goring results under such circumstances, the ox will not be declared tam,
but the owner will be free from liability because the children in inciting
the animal contributed to the goring. This is the equivalent of saying, in
modern language, that the plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant
where his own acts of negligence contributed to bring about his injury.145
BURDEN OF PROOF

As in Anglo-American law, so in Jewish law, the burden of establishing his claim is upon the plaintiff. The Mishnah says:
If an ox was pursuing another's ox which was afterwards found to be
injured, and the one (plaintiff) says "It was your ox that did the damage,"
while the other pleads, "not so but it was injured by a rock" (against which
it had been rubbing itself), the burden of proof lies on the daimant...

Another example given in the Talmud is one where plaintiff sued
defendant for the loss of two oxen by the goring of defendant's two oxen,
one of which was tam and the other mu'ad. The plaintiff maintained that
1

' Baba Kamma 23b, 24b
0
" Baba Kamma 24b
"dBaba Kamma 35a
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the mu'ad injured the big one and the tam the little one. The defendant
pleaded "Not so" for it was the tam that injured the big one and the
mu'ad that injured the little one. The Gemara resolves the case against
the plaintiff, holding that
The plaintiff is entitled to get paid only where he produces evidence
to substantiate his claim, but will have nothing at all when he fails to
do so."'
LAW OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
The Scriptural passages which form the basis for the law of damages
for personal injuries read thus:
And if a man maim his neighbor; as he hath done so shall it be done
to him: breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; as he hath maimed
a man so shall it be rendered unto him."'
And thine eye shall not pity- eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot."
The Mishnaic portion of the Talmud, however, sets out so specifically
not only that damages are to be paid for injury to persons by other persons but the measure of damages as well, that I deem it essential to a
complete understanding of this subject that the entire portion be set out
in full. It reads as follows:
One who injures a fellow man becomes liable to him for five items:
For Depreciation, For Pain, For Healing, For Loss of Time and For
Degradation.
How is it with "depreciaton"d'
If he put out his eye, cut off his arm
or broke his leg, the injured person is considered as if he were a slave being sold in the market place, and a valuation is made as to how much he
was worth (previously), and how much he is worth (now).
Pain-If he burnt him either with a spit or with a nail, even though
on his (finger) nail which is a place where no bruise could be made, it
has to be calculated how much a man of equal standing would require to
be paid to undergo such pain.
Healing- If he has struck him, he is under obligation to pay medical
expenses. Should ulcers (meanwhile) arise on his body, if as a result of
the wound, the offender would be liable, but if not as a result of the
wound, he would be exempt Where the wound was healed but reopened,
healed again but reopened, he would still be under obligation to heal him.
If, however, it had completely healed (but had subsequently reopened) he
would no more be under obligation to heal him.
Loss of Time- The injured person is considered as if he were a
watchman of cucumber beds (so that the loss of such wages sustained by
him during the period of illness may be reimbursed to him), for there
has already been paid to him the value of his hand or the value of his leg
(through which deprivation he would no more be able to carry on his previous employment).
Degradation - All to be estimated in accordance with the status of the
1
offender and the offended.
'
"' Baba Kamma 35b, 36a
i'i Leviticus 24: 20.
"'Deuteronomy 19:2 1.
I Baba Kamma 83b Soncino translation.

1951]

THE TALMUD

The interpretation in the Gemara, which follows immedately after
this section, is among the most exalted pronouncements to be found anywhere on earth, for we find in it a sublimation of lex talionws, which no
language can improve upon. The passage is as follows:
Why (pay compensation)? Does the Divine Law not say "Eye for
eye";' Why not take this literally to mean (putting out) the eye (of the
offender) ? Let not this enter your mind, since it has been taught: You
might think that where he put out his eye, the offender's eye should be put
our, or where he cut off his arm, the offender's arm should be cut off, or
again where he broke his leg, the offender's leg should be broken. (Not
" "And he that
so; for) it is laid down, "He that smiteth any man
" just as in the case of smiting a beast compensation is
smiteth a beast

to be paid, so also in the case of smiting a man compensation is to be
paid.2'

My primary purpose in setting forth copious quotations from the
Pentateuch, the Mishnah and the Gemara, is not to show the modernity
of the Tannaim in defining the law of damages, but to acquaint the reader
with what is perhaps the finest of all examples of the sublimity of the
Jewish approach to retributive justice. The concept of vengeance must
not enter one's mind. An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, is vengeance and must not be indulged in by humans for "Vengeance is Mine"
and "Justice is God's" is the Divine Commandment. 15'
It would do no harm and might indeed be enlightening to those who,
on occasion, are wont to refer to the Jewish law as the law of vengeance
to familiarize themselves with this passage in the Gemara.
It is a cardinal tenet of Jewish faith that every human being is
created in the image of God,153 and therefore each human being, by reason
of birth, is endowed with the unalienable right to life, of which no man
is permitted to deprive him. So sacred is human life that in the trial of
one accused of murder, a witness when taking the oath is solemnly warned
that should he bear false witness he may become the cause of the death
of a human being. He is therefore admonished:
For this reason a single man only (Adam) was created to teach you
that if one destroys a single person, the scripture imputes to him as though
he had destroyed the whole world, and if he saves the life of a single
person, the Scripture imputes to hun as though he had saved the whole

world.'
Since man knows that he was created in the image of God, the body
of every human being is sacred. Any injury committed upon his person
is therefore an act of irreverence, for in reality the destruction of another's limb is tantamount to taking a part of his body and is the destruc"Baba Kamma 83b
"2 Deuteronomy 32:35; Deuteronomy 1:17
1.27; Psalms 8.
Sanhedrin 45

'Genesis
'
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tion of a part of his life. The injury inflicted upon a human being is
therefore placed on a higher level than the injury caused to animals. The
payment of damages for injury to a human being is not merely compensatory, but expiatory as well. This concept is dearly posited by Mamonides at the very outset of his treatment of the law of damages to human
beings. According to the Rambam, (Maimomdes)
That which is written in the Torah, "As he hath maimed a man so
shall it be rendered unto him" does not mean to cause injury to the aggressor in the manner in which he has caused injury to the plaintiff, but
it connotes rather that in strict justice he should lose a member of his body
or be injured accordingly and therefore he must pay damages. And the
Torah says, 'Thou shalt not take ransom for the murderer." For the
murderer alone (who should suffer the death penalty) has no ransom,
but for causing the loss of organs or other bodily injuries there is ransom."'

The divergence between the Hebraic and the Anglo-American concept
of paying damages is made strikingly apparent from this passage of the
Rambam and from the Gemara. The common law concept is much more
pragmatic. The formula is: injury done-injury compensated for.
The entire blood feud idea, which is the basis for the vengeance theory
underlying our early concept of damages for tortious injury was repulsive
to Jewish jurisprudence. In Jewish law one was not required "to buy
spear from side or bear it." The duty of making peace for the wrongful act committed was, in concept, owed by the aggressor not to the injured person but to his Maker for trespassing upon one who was created
in His image.
DuE PROCESS.
Of formal criminal and civil procedure, as we understand it, little is
said in the Talmud, but the safeguards against precipitate and inquisitorial
methods of trial and pretrial, which are the embodiment of our constiiutional and juridic due process, are there dearly expounded.
Ordinary property actions which involved the payment of damages or
penalties were triable by courts of three judges.'5" In capital cases,
however, which involved the death penalty, jurisdiction was lodged in the
small Sanhedrin consisting of twenty-three jurists. 5 7 The great Sanhedrin,
whose function was legislative as well as judicial consisted of seventy-one
judges, and had exclusive jurisdiction in the trial of a high priest or one
charged with being a false prophet.
The Scriptural text in Deuteronomy is the wellspring of Jewish adjective law.
And I charged your judges at that time, saying, "Hear the causes between your brethren and judge righteously between a man and his brother
"Yad. Hobel U'mazek 13. See also Baba Kamma 83b
"Sanhedrin 11, 12, 13
" Sanhedrin 14
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and the stranger that is with him. Ye shall not respect persons in judgment, ye shall hear the small and the great alike; ye shall not be afraid of
"'
the face of any man; for the judgment is God's

The Gemara interprets the words, "And I charged your judges at that
time," as being a warning to them to use the rod and the lash with cau-

tion,' " and the phrase, "Hear the causes between your brethren and judge
righteously" is interpreted by Rab Hamna as a warning to the court not
to listen to the claims of a litigant in the absence of his opponent, and
to the litigant not to explain his case to the judge before his adversary
appears.600 The phrase "judge righteously" was construed by Resh Lakish
to mean, "Consider rightly all the aspects of the case before giving a decision." "Ye shall not respect persons in judgment" was interpreted in
the Gemara to mean, "Ye shall not favor anyone even if he be your friend,
and ye shall not estrange anyone even if he be your enemy."''
Concerning the last admonition, an interesting example is given in
the Talmud. A former host of Rab, it is said, came before him with a
lawsuit and, according to Rashi's interpretation, said, "Were you not once
my guest?" "Yes," he answered, "and what is your wish?" "I have a
case to be tried," he replied. "rhen," said Rab, "I am disqualified from
being your judge," and turmng to Rab Kahana he said, "Go you and
judge the case."'6 2
'Ye shall hear the small and great alike" meant that a lawsuit involving a mere perutah, (a corn of minimal value), must be regarded as of
the same importance as one involving a hundred minah, which was a
weight in gold or silver equal to 100 shekels. The Gemara asks, "Is it
not self-evident that this is what was intended by the passage in Deuteronomy?" The answer is given that it refers also to the priority which is
63
to be given a case of small consequence if it should be first in order.
The concern for the life of a human being, so keenly felt by Jewish
law in matters of injury to the person, was even more evident when the
State sought to take his life. In this field of jurisprudence Jewish law
attained its most humane and most modern expression. Whether the
trial involved a capital or non-capital cause, the inquiry and the examination according to Mosaic law, were equally thorough, "for it is written
'e shall have one manner of law.' ,,163a But only those who were legally
trained in the law could act as judges in the trial of cases involving
homicide.
Deuteronomy 1.16,17.
0

Sanhedrin 7b
Ibid.

"' Ibul.

a

Sanhedrin 7b, 8

"'Sanhedrin 8a
%Sanhedrm 41
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The defendant on trial for murder was clothed with the presumption
of innocence, and the questions put to him were required to be such as
would elicit reasons for acquittal, not conviction.'"
Circumstantial evidence, although allowed in civil suits, 16 5 was not
permitted in capital cases, no matter how convincing, for that is the Deuteronomic decree.'6 6 The Gemara speaks of such evidence as follows:
"What is meant (by) based on conjecture?' 67 He (the judge) says to
them: 'Perhaps ye saw him running after his fellow into a ruin, ye pursued
him, and found him sword in hand with blood dripping from it while the
victim was writhing in agony. If this is which ye saw, ye saw nothing."'
A witness's inferences were not admissible in civil or criminal cases;
he was required to state what he saw and heard and not his conclusions.
Hearsay evidence was also excluded. The Mishnah defines hearsay evtdence as "
such facts as come to the witnesses second hand." And,
even if the source of the statement was, in the opinion of the witness,
most trustworthy, it was nevertheless not admissible as being mere hear168
say.
The law required the accusing witnesses to be thoroughly and separately interrogated by the court'6 9 before charging the defendant with a
capital crime. A full bill of particulars was required of them, and the
judges were in duty bound to ask them in detail the year, the month, the
day, the hour, and the place of the commission of the crime, all to be answered with certainty. 70
The Mishnah places a stern duty upon a judge to cross-examine
thoroughly and vigorously, saying: "The more a judge tests the evidence,
the more is he deserving of praise." Any discrepancy of a serious nature
resulted in an immediate acquittal. For example, "if one (witness) said
'at the fifth hour' and the other (witness) said 'at the seventh,' their evidence becomes invalid
"171 All witnesses were under oath and had
to be sworn according to the Scriptural requirement against bearing false

witness.'

72

Only after a second witness corroborated the statement made by the
first could the court proceed to hear defense testimony and, if there was
no second witness there was an acquittal. The defendant was permitted
04 Ibzu.
'"

Sanhedrin 37b

ica

Sanhedrin 45

" Deuteronomy 17:6.
1
" Sanhedrin 37b
'eSanhedrin 52, 54
'ToSanhedrin 51
"

Sanhedrin 53

'Sanhedrin

45
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to take the stand in his own behalf."' 74 No one could be convicted of
crime merely upon his own confession.'
Shades of Wigmore! What with the stringent requirements for crossexamination and the prohibition against hearsay testimony, one finds in
these Talmudic rules a striking resemblance to some of our present day
rules of evidence.
After submission of the case, the judges could find the defendant innocent and acquit him on the day of trial. A finding of guilty required
deliberation and could not be made until the next day. During the deliberation the judges could eat little and drink no wine; they went together
in pairs and were required to discuss the case among themselves during
the entire night following the trial. On the following morning, they assembled in court for their decision. He who had previously favored conviction could change Ins mind and declare the defendant innocent; but he
who had previously favored acquittal could not retract and favor conviction. 75 If they could not agree, a vote was taken and the decision of the
majority prevailed; a majority of one was sufficient to acqit, but a majority of two judges was required for convictiom 76
Once acquitted the defendant could not be tried again for the same
offense, and this rule against double jeopardy was meticulously observed. 177 Although a verdict of guilty could be reversed, a verdict of
acquittal was not subject to reversal.' 78
The defendant, having been found guilty, could, while he was being
led to hIs execution, be reprieved and be brought back for further consideration if either he, or anyone else, could offer mitigating testimony
in his behalf. A crier on a charger would precede the condemned man
on the way to his execution, announcing: "Such a one, the son of such a
one, is going forth to be stoned for that he committed such or such offense. Such a one and such a one are witmesses against him. If any man
knoweth aught in favor of his acquittal, let him come and plead it.' " 9
And he could be brought back four or five times for the purpose of offering evidence, to afford him every opportunity to prove himself innocent
and obtain acquittal. 80
Finally, the Mishnah itself brands a court which executed one man in
'Sanhedrin 54
"'Makkoth 2b, 5a
"'Sanhedrin 52.

"'Sanhedrin 41
"'Sanhedrn 33b; Makkoth 4b, 13b.
' Sanhedrin 33b
' Sanhedrin 61.

- Sanhedrm 6a
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seventy years as ruinous. 181 And Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba say:
"Had we been in the Sanhedrin, none would ever have been put to
death."'"" Such was the concern of Jewish law for the life of a human
being and the treatment accorded him out of respect for the dignity of the
individual. This was the logical result of the basic concept that man was
created in God's image.
CONCLUSION

In presenting a few of the basic principles of Talmudic law, I was
prompted by the conviction that Jewish and Anglo-American legal mstitutions are, in many respects, quite similar, and that such similarity might
be of interest to students of law. I sought likewise to suggest that our
Anglo-American legal system, the younger of the two, was in part influenced by the thoughts and concepts found in the older.
It was my purpose also to indicate here and there the moral tenets
upon which the Judaic system of jurisprudence rests, and its effect upon
our concept of law. Of this aspect of our law, Fritz Berohheimer has
this to sayThe Mosaic dispensation is historically important not alone because of
the measures and institutions which it established among the Jewish people but because of the extensive circulation of the Scriptural idea. Moreover the fundamental features of Jewish institutions were ethical and these
ethical concepts in turn shaped the teachings of Christanity.'
In commenting upon the effects of the decline of the Holy Roman Em-

pire he continues:
Christiani displaced the Greek mythology and through its ethics influenced the development of law, the organization of government and the
freest expansion of both.'

We have been witnessing recently a renewal of the controversy between those to whom law is the embodiment of ethical standards and
those who think of the law merely as a science aimed at regulating the
external relations of men to each other and to their governments.
In a revolutionary era such as ours, in which our fundamental concepts of "property," "rights," "duties," "obligations," "mine," "yours,"
"state," "is," and "ought" are being weighed in the social balance with
two diametrically opposed systems vying with each other for acceptance
of their respective concepts to the exclusion of the other, it is important
to restudy our jurisprudence and reexamine the- fundamental groundwork

upon which our legal structure is imposed. Whatever divergent opinons
we may hold as to the application of the law, the basic tenet that our sys'm Makkoth 110

U Ibid.

BEROLzHBIMER, THE WoRLD's LEGAL PmiLoson-mns 40,41 (1924).
89.

U4 Ibtd.
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tern of jurisprudence is fundamentally the result of the moral growth and
development of our Anglo-American civilization must be made unqualifiedly certain.
Jewish law has much to offer to our entire concept of ethical and
legal standards. Jeremiah's synthesis between legal duty and moral obligation is as valid today as when it was uttered: "God will put the law
into men's innermost feelings and will write it in their hearts."'8 5 Here
is the doctrine which must ultimately become the guiding juridic and
social concept if we are to be free from the principle of statism embodied
in the pagan, Hobbesian maxim, "Authority, not truth, makes the law,"
wnch has permeated the minds of so many.
For what is right and what is wrong must ultimately be tested in the
crucible of the conscience of man and not by the imposition of the rationalized will of one upon the other through the power of might. The
same may be said of the motivation for compliance with law. According
to Jeremiah's formula, observance of the law must stem from an inner
persuasion to do that which is inherently just rather than from fear of
punishment. The law is, of course, an agency for compelling obedience
to the will of the community. But it would be cynical, as well as harmful, particularly in our present struggle for the nnnds of men, to rely
upon the doctrine of the "bad man's" obedience to law out of fear of an
adverse result to the exclusion of the inner impulse which motivates the
overwhelming majority of people to comply with legal injunctions. The
legal philosophy of the "bad man" is pregnant with the seed of the law's
self-destruction.
Justice Holmes, Olympian though he may have been in American
jurisprudence, nevertheless, regrettably adopted the "bad man" concept of
the lawWhat constitutes the law? You will find some text writers telling you

that it is something different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction
from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not which may or
may not coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our friend
the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms
or deductions but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts or
English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact and nothing more pretentious
are what I mean by the law.'
Jewish law differs from Holmes's thesis for according to its concept
morality is not alone the depositary from which the law is taken but is in
fact itself law. The power of authority, therefore, in Judaic jurisprudence
'Jeremiah 31:33.
'Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L REv. 457, 461.
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is derived from the law, which is first in the order of precedence and is,
therefore, of primary importance.
According to Holmes's scientific theory of the law, one may breach a
contract irrespective of how morally wrong it may be to do so and pay
damages. His debt to society is thereby paid, for scientifically that is all
the law requires of him. And that is the end of the matter. If A were
to breach his agreement and sell to another, B could feel secure in the
prophecy of his lawyer that he would obtain damages, and A could feel
secure in his lawyer's prophecy that he need only pay damages. Not so
in Jewish law. Something more is expected of him who enters into such
a contract, for the one breaking the agreement has committed not only a
breach of contract but a moral wrong as well. For Jewish law is not so
much concerned with the negative aspect of the breach of an agreement
and the result flowing therefrom as with the positive aspect of fulfilling
the contract. A's standard of conduct, inherently right or wrong, is here
involved. For the breach of the agreement proper there may be no more
remedy in Jewish law courts than is permitted at common law, namely,
the payment of damages, but there is a greater deterrent to the act of
breaching than the payment of damages, namely, the moral duty of fulfilling a promise. In a sense Anglo-American equity jurisprudence has
approximated this view.
Jewish law is a part of the Torah. Its application, therefore, is not
limited to what courts will or will not enforce. The Torah looks rather
to what is inherently right or wrong, to that which is basically just or
unjust.
The criterion of Judaic legal doctrine is not alone its momentary
utility. Jewish jurisprudence measures the worth of legal principles by
the extent to which such principles penetrate the inwardness of the daily
life of the masses of the people impelling them to justice, truth, mercy
and humility. An example or two may suffice to indicate the interweaving of the moral and the legal concepts in the Talmud. Thus, we find
that if A owes B a past due obligation, which B collects from A by way
of execution upon his property, A can later obtain, by way of redemption,
the property he lost to B, provided B has not in the interim transferred
the title thereto to another. This is the meaning of the Jewish principle of law known as "return of evaluation," which is based upon the
broad moral Deuteronomic pronouncement, "And thou shalt do that which
87
is right and good."'
Again, if A and B are owners of contiguous lots, Jewish law provides
that neither can sell his lot to C without first giving the right of purchase
to the other. This is called "preemption" in Jewish law. Preemption has
7Deuteronomy 6:18; Baba Mezia 35a
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the force of law through the same Deuterononmc moral exhortation, "And
thou shalt do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord." The
theory is that the lot between A and B would be more useful to either
than another field not adjacent to theirs, and as to C it might make no
difference whether he bought that lot or another.8 s Again, if between
the lots of A and B there is vacant land, C, who desires to make the purchase thereof, is under moral compulsion not to do so until he has afforded either A or B an opportunity to obtain that contiguous property.
It is not to be assumed from what has been said that Jewish law does
not recogmze the need for temporal government and the efficacy of force
for keeping peace among men and for preserving their rights. Jewish
law is as practical as it is idealistic and moral in its concept of law enforcement and observance of legal duty. Jewish jurisprudence taught
what the framers of our democracy knew so well- that obedience to
authority based upon force alone leads to barbarism, but that "no government can be maintained without the principle of fear as well as duty."'18 9
Jeremiah advised his people after they were led captive into Babylon
to lead normal lives there and be law-abiding citizens: "Seek ye the peace
of the city whither I have caused you to be carried away captive, and pray
unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof shall ye have peace."'19 0
Jewish law may thus be seen to be a very practical process of establishing rights, duties and obligations between man and man, and man
and his government, as well as man's duties to God. Its highest imperative is knowledge of the law, for only through knowledge can conviction
be gained. The greater the conviction the less reliance need be placed
upon force or fear of force. Such a concept brings about a high appreciation of the legal as well as the moral duties impelling men not to do to
others what they would not have done unto them.
In the reestablished state of Israel the laws in process of formulation
will, it is expected, be based on Talmudic laws adapted to modern conditions.
The needs of the times, the safety of the state, the institutions which
immigrants from all over the globe bring with them, will undoubtedly
make their imapact upon the laws of this state.
Certain it is, however, that the moral law which is the basic motif of
Jewish jurisprudence, and Zedek, the leitmotif which connotes righteousness and justice, will be kept steadfast, and upon these the modern legal
superstructure will be built.
Baba Mezia 108a
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to J. W Eppes.
'Jeremih 29:7.

